More than 40,000 operations conducted by the Central Reserve Police Force’s (CRPF) elite Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) units underline the scale of the security forces’ sustained campaign against Left Wing Extremism (LWE), with thousands of Maoists apprehended or surrendering and large quantities of weapons and explosives recovered.
According to an assessment of the CRPF’s operational performance, the force’s counter-LWE strategy has increasingly shifted from individual encounters to sustained security campaigns aimed at weakening Maoist organisational networks, disrupting their logistical capabilities and preventing armed groups from regaining control of areas once cleared by security forces.
Official cumulative figures cited in the assessment show that CoBRA units had conducted 40,231 operations up to June 30, 2026.
During these operations, security forces reported 641 Maoists neutralised, 3,995 apprehended and 3,420 surrendering.
The operations also resulted in the recovery of 1,928 weapons, 69,228 rounds of ammunition, 9,689 IEDs, bombs and grenades, and 84,596 detonators.
The figures indicate the scale of the operational challenge in areas affected by Left Wing Extremism and the sustained deployment of security forces over several years.
The CRPF maintains an operational presence in several major LWE-affected areas across central and eastern India.
These include Bastar, Sukma, Bijapur, Dantewada, Narayanpur and Kanker in Chhattisgarh; Gadchiroli in Maharashtra; Malkangiri in Odisha; and West Singhbhum and Latehar in Jharkhand.
The deployment involves not only regular CRPF battalions and CoBRA units but also Bomb Detection and Disposal Squads, intelligence teams, communications personnel and medical and logistical support.
The combination of these specialised capabilities is aimed at allowing security forces to operate for extended periods in remote and difficult terrain while maintaining communication, intelligence and logistical support.
The assessment suggests that the significance of the operational figures goes beyond the number of encounters or personnel neutralised.
Large-scale recoveries of weapons, ammunition and explosive devices have affected the Maoist network’s ability to maintain its armed operations and logistical supply chains.
At the same time, apprehensions and surrenders are seen as indicators of pressure on the wider organisational network that supports armed cadres.
The strategy has also increasingly focused on preventing insurgent groups from returning to areas after security forces have conducted operations there.
This has led to greater emphasis on permanent area domination, including the establishment of Forward Operating Bases, permanent security camps and long-duration patrols.
Security forces have also been deployed to provide protection for road and other infrastructure projects in remote areas, where development work has previously faced disruption because of security threats.
The approach is intended to consolidate security gains and create conditions for civil administration and development activities to resume and expand.
Intelligence has emerged as a key component of the CRPF’s counter-LWE operations.
Human intelligence is being supplemented by technical intelligence, secure communication systems and, where publicly documented, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) reconnaissance.
Long-range patrols and Forward Operating Bases have further enabled security personnel to maintain a continuous presence in areas that were previously difficult to access.
The use of intelligence-led planning has also allowed forces to focus their operations more closely on the organisational and logistical networks supporting Maoist armed cadres.
During the tenure of DG G.P. Singh, the CRPF continued to emphasise intelligence-led operations, coordination between different security agencies and sustained area domination.
The period further consolidated the CRPF’s role as the principal Central Armed Police Force involved in the country’s counter-LWE operations.
The evolving counter-LWE strategy reflects a broader understanding of what constitutes success against an insurgency.
Rather than measuring progress only through encounters or the number of armed cadres neutralised, security operations are increasingly focused on weakening the organisational structure of Maoist groups, disrupting their supply networks and maintaining security in areas cleared of insurgent influence.
The ability to hold territory after an operation has also become an important part of the strategy.
Permanent security camps, regular patrols and protection for infrastructure projects are intended to prevent Maoist groups from returning to areas where their influence has been reduced.
The larger objective is to create a stable security environment in which government administration, infrastructure development and essential services can operate more consistently.
With more than 40,000 CoBRA operations recorded up to June 2026, the CRPF’s counter-LWE campaign reflects a long-term operational approach combining armed operations, intelligence gathering, area domination and support for the return of civil administration and development to affected areas.